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Abstract
Evaluates the legal organization and past operations of OPEC in order to undersatnd it and
anticipate in what direction this new economic power is headed.
OPEC AS A LEGAL ENTITY
INTRODUCTION
In 1960, responding to a fall in petroleum prices, representa-
tives from five oil producing states' met in Baghdad to discuss
their common plight. The result of this conference was the found-
ing of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
From a cautious beginning, OPEC survived a decade of muddling
and, in early 1971, firmly established itself as a major force in the
petroleum industry. 2 Currently, the thirteen member 3 organization
is considered to be an important factor in, perhaps even a threat
to, the world's economy. 4 OPEC has outlived the many predictions
of its downfall, and a major reason for this success has been its ef-
fective organization. 5 Accordingly, in order to understand OPEC
and to anticipate in what direction this new economic power is
headed, one must evaluate its legal organization and its past opera-
tions.
Defining OPEC is perhaps the most difficult but most impor-
tant step in understanding its organization. OPEC is usually de-
scribed as a cartel, and, to some extent, it fits that description in
practice;6 yet OPEC is more than a mere cartel, and this fact
might partially explain its remarkable success. 7 The thirteen mem-
1. Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela are the Founding Members
of OPEC. Z. MIKDASHI, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES 52
(1976) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL POLITICS].
2. In 1971, OPEC threatened to embargo the oil supplies of any oil company
that failed to accept a 55% tax rate on oil imposed in late 1970 by the OPEC Mem-
bers. See OPEC, Res. XXI.120 for the procedural authority supporting such action.
3. Qatar, Libya, Indonesia, United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi), Algeria,
Nigeria, Ecuador, and Gabon are all Full Members, in addition to the five Founding
Members. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 1, at 52.
4. From the standpoint of the average American, OPEC's power can be seen in
the dramatic increase in the price of gasoline and the gasoline shortages in the sum-
mer of 1979.
5. D. RUSTOW & J. MUNGO, OPEC: SUCCESS AND PROSPECTS 94 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as RUSTOW].
6C. The purpose of the cartel is to artificially affect supply and demand curves.
See W. OUALID, INTERNATIONAL RAW MATERIALS CARTELS 16 (1938). See also Z.
MIKDASHI, THE COMMUNITY OF OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES: A STUDY IN GOVERN-
MENTAL COOPERATION 96 (1972) [hereinafter cited as COMMUNITY].
7. While OPEC is a cartel by definition, it has shown that solid organization,
represented by the ability to quell internal conflicts between Members' individual
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her organization has been recognized by one Western state as a ju-
ridical person;8 giving the organization, through its Secretariat, cer-
tain legal and diplomatic advantages. 9 Perhaps the simplest and
most accurate definition has been given by Jahangir Amuzegar:
"OPEC is what OPEC does."' 10 By themselves, these words are in-
sufficient, but they suggest an approach towards defining OPEC
-namely, why does OPEC exist, how does it operate, and most
importantly, what has it done. Each of these questions suggests a
different perspective from which an understanding of OPEC can be
gained."
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: WHY OPEC?
The Baghdad Conference (September, 1960) was called by the
Republic of Iraq to examine the state of the petroleum industry at
that time.' 2 The environment created by the international oil in-
dustry had three major characteristics: a highly-concentrated struc-
ture, vertical integration of the oil companies, and the oil conces-
sion system.' 3 As a result of these features, the seven major oil
companies l were able to decide the crucial policies of production
goals in order to present a general framework for individual policies, can stand up to
the natural effects of supply and demand. In addition, the growing demand for oil
has aided OPEC's power and cohesion. See notes 96-103 infra and accompany-
ing text.
8. OPEC, Headquarters Agreement between the Republic of Austria and
OPEC (1965).
9. See, e.g., id. art. 3 (the recognition of OPEC's extraterritoriality, i.e., that
OPEC operations are separate from the domain of Austria); art. 4 (the capacity of
OPEC to make contracts, the capacity to acquire and dispose of property, and the ca-
pacity to sue); art. 6-9 (grants of immunity to OPEC from legal proceedings, state ac-
tion, and taxation).
10. Amuzegar, The Oil Story: Facts, Fiction and Fair Play, 51 FOREIGN AFF.
684 (1973).
11. Unlike other articles dealing with OPEC, this Note will avoid analyzing
OPEC from an economic standpoint. It is intended to aid in understanding OPEC as
a legal entity, thereby enabling the reader to anticipate OPEC's future effects on the
world economy.
12. There had been previous discussions by the oil-producing states, but those
discussions never amounted to any action. See generally RUSTOW, supra note 5, for a
brief history of these pre-OPEC groups.
13. COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 35. These characteristics can be defined as
follows: "highly-concentrated structure" refers to the almost oligarchic control of oil
production, first by the seven major oil companies, later by OPEC members; "verti-
cal integration" describes the control of all phases of oil production from exploration
and drilling to refining; "oil concession system" is the leasing of oil fields by an oil
exporting state to a company in return for royalties on production. Id.
14. Exxon, British Petroleum, Shell, Standard California, Mobil, Gulf, and
Texaco. See RUSTOW, supra note 5, at 3.
1979-1980]
and pricing, whereby the oil-producing states would receive only a
limited share of the production revenues. 15 Whenever individual
states took action against the abuses of the system, as did Iran in
1951, they would meet with failure. 16
OPEC was the product of a common emotion against this ex-
ploitation by the oil-consumer states. 17 The Founding Members 18
recognized that their economies depended, to a large extent, upon
petroleum income and that this source of revenue was a "wasting
asset."' 9 Realizing they could meet the inequities caused by the
three features of the oil industry only through concerted action,
the states at the Baghdad Conference created OPEC. 20 OPEC was
formed, therefore, to correct the abuses of the then-existing petro-
leum industry and to protect the revenues of those states that
relied on oil exports as the cornerstone of their economies through
the unification of petroleum policies, 2 ' through the prevention of
competitive quarrels, 22 and by taking concerted action towards
common interests. 23
II. THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF OPEC
A. Membership
Membership in OPEC is divided into Full and Associate
Members and is open to any state that satisfies the membership
test. 24 The criteria for joining OPEC, as set out by the Baghdad
Conference, are twofold. First, the state seeking membership must
15. See id. at 2-4.
16. Jensen, International Oil-Shortage, Cartel or Emerging Resource Monop-
oly, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 335, 345-48 (1974). Since OPEC has been formed,
Libya successfully raised its petroleum tax in 1970; however, due to a pipeline cut in
Syria, there was a shortage of Saudi Arabian oil in the Western European market, the
main consumer of Libyan oil. Thus, Libya could act without fear of being undersold
by other oil producers. Id. at 346.
17. See generally RUSTOW, supra note 5, at 95.
18. See note 1 supra.
19. OPEC, Introduction to the Conference (1960). In other words, oil was a
depleting, non-replenishable resource.
20. OPEC Res. 1.1 (1960); OPEC, Introduction to the Conference (1960). For
the convenience of the reader, the Roman numeral refers to the Conference meeting
at which the resolution was passed, and the Arabic numeral places the resolution in
the historical order of Conference action.
21. Azzam, The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 57
AM. J. INT'L L. 112, 112 (1963).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See OPEC Res. 1.2 (1960).
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have a substantial net export of crude oil, and second, the state
must be accepted by three-quarters of the Full Members with a
concurrence of all five Founding Members.2 5 Since most highly
industrialized states consume far more oil than they produce, the
first membership requirement seems by definition to exclude them
automatically from membership consideration. Furthermore, ac-
ceptance by all five Founding Members appears in practice to safe-
guard the homogeneity of the organization. Because these two cri-
teria are likely to insure that common interests, both economic and
social,26 will be maintained within the organization, OPEC has the
potential to be a cohesive and decisive group. 27
B. The Resolution Procedure
Resolutions are OPEC's only expression of policy.28 While
they represent the legal effect of OPEC, the resolutions, and espe-
cially the procedure under which they are formulated, 29 clearly
illustrate the most divisive element within OPEC: the state sover-
eignty principle.
Because of the respect for state sovereignty, Member states
are required only to follow the decrees of the organization with an
obligation of good faith.30 OPEC has no legal sanctions against er-
rant or contrary practices by any individual state.31 Rather than
force individual Members to follow an undesirable resolution,
OPEC passes a resolution only upon the unanimous vote of all the
25. OPEC Res. VIII. 56, art. 7C (1965), reprinted in 4 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1175 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Statute]. See note 38 infra and accompanying text.
26. The producing states have economies somewhat dependent upon petro-
leum and would not naturally align themselves with the consumer states. Thus,
England, assuming the North Sea Oil field allows exportation, would probably never
pass the membership test. It is questionable whether Mexico, because of its ties with
the United States, would be accepted.
27. See generally INTERNATIONAL POLrics, supra note 1, at 54.
28. See Statute, supra note 25, art. 15(1), art. 11C. These sections state the
power of the Conference to make policy and describe the procedure through which
this power is used-i.e., resolutions, although the term "resolution" is only used in
actual practice and is not used in the Statute.
29. The procedure is found in the Statute, supra note 25, art. 11.
30. Id. art. 3.
31. The Enforcement Department of the Secretariat is charged only with moni-
toring the implementation of resolutions by Members. See Statute, supra note 25, art.
36. Nobody other than the Conference can act against a Member, and since such ac-
tion requires a unanimous vote by the Conference, see note 32 infra, it is unlikely
any action would ever be taken.
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delegates to the Conference, 32 a practice which hopes to promote
faithful observance through the removal of controversial policies.
Although the resolutions are passed under conditions of unanimity,
they do not impose automatic acceptance upon the Members;33
thus, resolutions are accepted only when they are compatible with
the interests of the individual state. 34 Furthermore, the typical ter-
minology of the resolutions implies that there is no obligation to
accept them. 35
Resolutions are considered to have the same juridical character
as a treaty and are intended by OPEC to be followed as such. 36
Once a resolution is accepted, therefore, it becomes a part of the
Member's municipal laws. 37 The importance of this assimilation is
that in a concession dispute, it seems the municipal laws of the
source state should apply. 38
By couching its resolutions in advisory rather than in assertive
language, OPEC appears to be trying to project an image of
32. Statute, supra note 25, art. lIC. Substantive issues require unanimity of all
Full Members. Id.
33. See Statute, supra note 25, art. 3. The Statute only speaks of a good faith
obligation to follow resolutions. Id.
34. M. EL-SAYED, L'ORGANIZATION DES PAYS EXPOBTATEURS DE PETROLE
200 (1967).
35. Id. at 197. Typical language is "resolves," or "recommends."
36. Id. at 136. The juridical character of treaties is that treaties impose binding
obligations on party-states. This obligation rests partly upon the principle of pacta
sunt servanda-following in good faith what one agrees to do. J. STARKE, INTRO-
DUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 459 (8th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as STARKE].
37. The force of treaties internally depends upon the individual state's constitu-
tional treatment of the treaties. See STARKE, supra note 36 at 481-82. A survey of the
constitutions of the Member states show that each accepts treaties made by repre-
sentatives of the government as a part of the municipal law of the state. The relevant
sections of the respective constitutions are: Iran art. 24; Iraq art. 45; Kuwait art. 70;
Saudi Arabia art. 18; Venezuela art. 128; Libya art. 23; Indonesia arts. 5(1), 11, 20;
Algeria, no provision on point, but see art. 28; Nigeria art. 74; Ecuador arts. 184(3),
132; Gabon and Abu Dhabi apparently have no written constitutions; reprinted and
edited in A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS (3d ed. 1965).
38. The precedent for such application may be found in the 1951 decision of
the International Court of Justice concerning the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. United Kingdom v. Iran, [1951] I.C.J. 89. The Court held that the nationali-
zation of the company by Iran was valid since Iranian law, not British law, would ap-
ply. Of course, the Court's decisions have no precedential value and can serve only
as a guideline. Mirvahabi, Claims to the Oil Resources in the Persian Gulf: Will the
World Economy Be Controlled by the Gulf in the Future?, 11 TEX. INT'L L. J. 95, 96
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Mirvahabi]. See also G. Kozanec, Problems Juridiques
Internationaux des Concessions Petrolures, 36 Y.A.A.A. HAGUE ACAD. INT'L L. 48
(1966).
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unity. 39 The practical effect, however, is that a Member can vote
in favor of an advisory resolution and then disregard it without fear
of reprisal. The same practical effect holds true even when the res-
olutions are framed as assertive mandates. 40 While the resolutions
have a legal importance, the state sovereignty principles inherent
in the resolution procedure seem to undercut any autonomous
power that may have been conferred upon the organization, thus
stripping OPEC of its potentially dynamic role as a leader of the oil
exporters.
C. OPEC's Government
One of OPEC's strongest features is its governmental organiza-
tion. 41 Although the governing body originally was created at the
Second Conference in 1961,42 its present form was established by
the Statute of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries, which was drafted at the Eighth Conference in 1965. 43 The
Statute seems to outline fully the tripartite government of the or-
ganization, clearly delineating the powers and functions of each
branch-the Conference, the Board of Governors, and the Secre-
tariat. 44
i. The Conference
The Conference has been designated as the supreme authority
of the organization 45 and is composed of delegations from each of
the Member states. A quorum of three-quarters of the delegations
needs to be present to hold the Conference.4 6 For the purpose of
voting, the Conference distinguishes between Full and Associate
Members. While all Members are expected to participate in Con-
ference meetings, only Full Members may vote.4 7 Although the
delegation may have more than one representative, each delegation
is limited to one vote. 48
39. See INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 1, at 59-60.
40. See note 101 infra and accompanying text.
41. See INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 1, at 76.
42. OPEC Res. 11.6 (1961).
43. Statute, supra note 25.
44. Id. art. 9.
45. Id. art. 10.
46. Id. art. 116.
47. Id. arts. 7E, 11C; INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 1, at 54 gives the
distinctions between Full and Associate Members.
48. Statute, supra note 25, arts. llA, llC. Full Members may cast one vote per
delegation; Associate Members do not vote in the Conference, but participate in the
1979-1980]
The primary functions of the Conference are to formulate the
general policy of OPEC and to determine the appropriate imple-
mentation thereof.49 Other duties, mostly procedural in nature,
give the Conference control over the finances of the organization
and the other branches of the government. 50 Usually, the Confer-
ence will meet twice a year;51 however, an extraordinary meeting
may be called, 52 as was done during the oil negotiations in 1971. 53
ii. The Board of Governors
The managerial branch of OPEC is the Board of Governors. 54
The Board is composed of one governor from each member state,
each with one vote. 55 Two-thirds of the governors need to be
present for a quorum,5 6 and a simple majority of those present is
necessary to carry a motion. 57 Unlike the Conference, which is es-
sentially an ad hoc body, the Board is permanent and meets "at
suitable intervals in the year," as determined by the Chairman of
the Board. 58 A governor serves a term of two years, 59 but may be
removed from the Board by a two-thirds majority vote of the entire
Board if that governor is found to be acting contrary to the inter-
ests of the organization. 60 In conjunction with a duty to obey the
orders of the Conference, the Board has two main functions: to
manage the affairs of the organization through the implementation
of Conference resolutions, and to prepare recommendations for
Conference action. 61
Conference debates prior to voting. Id. art. 7E. See note 47 supra, and accompany-
ing text.
49. Statute, supra note 25, art. 15(1).
50. See id. art. 15.
51. Id. art. 12.
52. Id. The Secretary-General also is authorized to call an extraordinary meet-
ing. Id. art. 18.
53. The 1971 Tehran meeting was set up by Conference vote at the Twenty-
first Conference in December, 1970. See note 96 infra.
54. Statute, supra note 25, art. 20.
55. Id. art. 17D. All Members nominate and are represented by a Governor,
who must be confirmed by the Conference. If a Governor is absent, the Member state
may replace him with an ad hoc Governor for that meeting without confirmation
from the conference. Id. art. 17C.
56. Id. art. 17B.
57. Id. art. 17D.
58. Id. art. 18. The Chairman should consult with the Secretary-General before
calling the meeting. Extraordinary meetings may be called by the Chairman, the
Secretary-General, or by two-thirds of the Governors. Id.
59. Id. art. 17E.
60. Id. art. 23.
61. Id. art. 20.
OPEC
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iii. The Secretariat
The Secretariat was not originally a separate entity within
OPEC; instead, its duties came under the control of the Board of
Governors, and the Chairman of the Board had a secondary duty as
Secretary-General. 62 As OPEC began to grow during the early
1960's, the position of Secretary-General became too burdensome
to be a secondary function. The 1965 Statute, therefore, created
the Secretariat as a separate branch to carry out the executive func-
tions of the organization. 63
Originally, the Secretary-General was appointed by the Con-
ference to serve a term of one year." The Secretary-General was
required to be a national of one of the Member states and needed
the unanimous support of the Conference. 65 Appointments were
made on a rotational basis-each Founding Member would have
one of its nationals serve as Secretary-General, then the appoint-
ments would rotate around the Full Members according to senior-
ity of membership. 66 The Conference decided that after 1970 the
position of Secretary-General would be more effective if the term
of service were longer and if the qualifications for appointment were
more stringent. 67 The term of service was extended to three years
and was made renewable.6 8 The rotational system of nomination
was discarded;69 however, if no nominees met the new qualifica-
tions, appointments were to be made on a two-year term rotational
basis. 70 Although the new selection process seemed to be aimed at
reducing problems arising from the state sovereignty principles,
the Conference has been unable to agree upon any nominee under
62. When the Statute was originally conceived, OPEC Res. 11.6 (1961), the or-
ganization was composed of the Conference and Board of Governors. Id. § 2. The
Chairman of the Board carried the duty of Secretary-General. Id. § 4.8.
63. The Secretariat is the research unit, the administrative body, and the legal
representative of OPEC. Statute, supra note 25, arts. 27A, 29. See INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS, supra note 1, at 55.
64. Statute, supra note 25, art. 28.
65. Id. arts. 28A, 15(10), llC.
66. Id.
67. See OPEC Res. XX.117 (1970). The minimum qualifications are: (1) nomi-
nee must be 35 years of age, (2) he must have a university degree in Law, Econom-
ics, Science, Engineering, or Business Administration, and (3) he must have 15 years
of relevant experience. Id.
68. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 1, at 56.
69. See id.
70. The rotational system is substantially similar to the system found in the
Statute, supra note 25, art. 28.
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the new system. Appointments, therefore, have been made on the
rotational basis. 71
The duties of the Secretariat are to prepare studies for the
Conference and to serve as an information center both for the ben-
efit of the Members and for public relations with non-Members. 72
Although the Secretary-General is charged with performing these
duties, he may delegate his authority to the five departments of
the Secretariat. 73 The employees of the Secretariat are considered
to be international employees, owing no allegiance to any one
Member. 7a This feature seems to strengthen the concept of OPEC
as an autonomous organization.
While the powers of the Secretariat, as described within the
Statute, appear to make this branch a strong instrument of the or-
ganization, it has never been given sufficient Member support to
fulfill its potential. 75 The failure of the Secretariat to become a
strong force within OPEC again seems to indicate the corrosive ef-
fect of state sovereignty principles upon the power of OPEC as a
supergovernmental organization.
III. OPEC IN OPERATION
As Amuzegar's description of OPEC implies, 76 the only effect-
ive way to understand the mechanization of OPEC is to see it in
action. The acts of OPEC clearly show the limits of its purposes. 77
71. See INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 1, at 56.
72. See Statute, supra note 25, arts. 29-39.
73. Id. art. 33. Performing these duties are five departments: the Administration
Department; the Economics Department, which studies the petroleum market for the
informational benefit of OPEC Members; the Enforcement Department, which re-
views the legal aspects of the petroleum industry, as well as following the develop-
ment of resolution implementation; the Public Relations Department; and the Tech-
nical Department, which studies technical improvements in the industry. See id.
arts. 34-38. In 1977, the Secretariat was restructured to meet an increasing work load.
See OPEC ANN. REP. 58-59 (1977).
74. Statute, supra note 25, art. 32.
75. See COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 56. Rather than making the Secretariat a
strong, independent entity that could exert some control over the Members-in other
words, a leader of the oil-exporting interests-the 1977 restructuring turned the Sec-
retariat primarily into a research organization. OPEC ANN. REP. 59 (1977).
76. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
77. "OPEC is a limited-purpose alliance of governments bent on maximizing
their medium-term monetary returns from oil." RUSTOW, supra note 5, at 90-91. This
quote points to two factors in OPEC's operations: its limited economic purpose and
its deference to state sovereignty. A third factor is the metamorphosis of OPEC from
a defensive group to a dynamic economic power. OPEC ANN. REP. 58 (1977).
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OPEC has not integrated its Members' economies, but has
coordinated their policies concerning oil production. 78 Since the
Third Conference in 1961, OPEC has sought to develop a uniform
production policy;79 however, in 1971, the Twenty-third Confer-
ence finally resolved to hold back a joint production program. 80
While the OPEC Economic Commission 8' acknowledges that the
failure to unite the Members' various petroleum policies is a threat
to OPEC's existence, the Conference has resisted imposing any
formal plan of production control.8 2 The absence of a system of
uniform production may lead to future trouble if oil consumption
drops, 83 because a decrease in demand may result in price reduc-
tions. 84
Although no formal production policy has ever been imple-
mented, OPEC has created informal production controls through
the principle of supply and demand. 85 OPEC's most visible func-
tion is to set price guidelines.8 6 While OPEC does not force its
Members to observe these suggested prices, the five states
-Venezuela and the four major Persian Gulf producers-who con-
trol 72 percent of the total OPEC production have maintained
78. COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 69. Integration is almost impossible when one
considers the social, geographical, and economic differences among the Members,
e.g., a populous, tropical state such as Indonesia and a sparcely populated, desert
state such as Saudi Arabia.
79. OPEC Res. 111.26 (1961).
80. OPEC Res. XXIII.133 (1971).
81. The Economic Commission is a separate research body within OPEC, work-
ing in conjunction with the Economics Department. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, su-
pra note 1, at 55.
82. Cf. F. WYANT, THE UNITED STATES, OPEC, AND MULTINATIONAL OIL 95
(1977) (use of pricing policy as an alternative to formal production controls) [herein-
after cited as WYANT].
83. Comment, Cartel Pricing in the International Energy Market: OPEC in
Perspective, 54 ORE. L. REV. 643, 663-64 (1975).
84. See Levy, World Oil Cooperation of International Chaos, 52 FOREIGN AFF.
690, 710 (1974). But see generally WYANT, supra note 82, at 112-21 for an economic
analysis that may counter this position.
85. See RUSTOW, supra note 5, at 99; INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 1,
at 60-61 for examples of this informal production control.
86. There are three types of pricing: (1) posted price-a legal fiction used by
exporters to calculate royalties and tax forms from companies who produce and keep
the oil, (2) buyback price-applied to oil produced by the companies, but owned by
exporters through participation agreements, then bought by the companies, and (3)
open-market price-applied to participation oil not bought back or to oil sold on the
open market. See Loumiet, Toward an International Commodity Agreement on Pe-
troleum, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 513 (1975).
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close adhesion to OPEC's price policy. 8 7 The other Member states
must bring their prices in line with the five major producers in or-
der to remain competitive, and in the past higher prices have been
driven back into conformity with OPEC guidelines by this proc-
ess.8s It follows that over-production by one state can be curtailed
if the major producers slightly increase their production while
maintaining lower prices: the smaller state would be faced with an
economically destructive surplus. 89 It seems that as long as these
five states dominate production and remain moderate with respect
to following OPEC price guidelines, 90 OPEC can continue to pres-
ent a consistent production policy to the consumer states, assuring
them of a supply of oil at a "fair" price. 91
OPEC has made substantial external gains in the international
petroleum industry. 92 The industry is based upon the concession
system, 93 which has influenced OPEC's actions. In its first ten
years, major successes were accomplished in two pricing areas. 94
First, a new method of royalty payments was established in 1963
called "expensing royalties," which changed royalty payments from
a credit to an expense for the purposes of taxes. 95 Second, the 55
87. RUSTOW, supra note 5, at 99.
88. Id.
89. WYANT, supra note 82, at 95. See id. at 95-112 for a discussion of the eco-
nomic interrelationship of the OPEC states with respect to oil production.
90. Of course, Iran, traditionally a moderate on oil policies because of ties with
the United States, is now a question mark both for its production ability and for its
policies, since the Shah has been deposed.
91. "Fair" is a relative term. OPEC's conception of a fair price might be sub-
stantially different than that of the consumer states.
92. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 1, at 81; See RUSTOW, supra note 5,
at 32.
93. Mirvahabi, supra note 38, at 94. See note 13 supra, for a definition of the
concession system.
94. See notes 95-96 infra for the events surrounding "expensing royalties" and
the "55% minimum tax rate." The significance of these two items is that the charges
revolutionized revenue sharing. The pre-OPEC system allowed royalties to be cred-
ited towards any taxes paid on oil profits to the source state. The effect of credit roy-
alties was that a 12V2% royalty would cancel any tax liability. By turning these roy-
alty payments to an expense, OPEC separated royalties from tax payments, which
could increase revenues to the source state to a reasonable level. OPEC, Background
Information: Explanatory Memoranda on Resolutions IV. 32, IV. 33, and IV. 34, at
13-14 (1962). The 55% minimum tax, which was coupled with premium payments for
freight advantage and other miscellaneous items, also represented a significant in-
crease in revenues to the source states. The true importance was that OPEC was, for
the first time, able to influence oil prices to a significant degree. See OPEC, RECORD
AND REVIEW, 7-8 (1971).
95. The Conference, in 1962, passed three resolutions in order to meet a con-
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percent tax rate on net income of oil company operations within
Member states was established in 1971.96 The net effect of these
changes has been a substantial increase in revenues to the Mem-
bers as compared to revenues derived from the old system of
credit royalties and "50-50 revenue sharing." 97
These two gains in the pricing area seem to indicate the power
of OPEC when it does act as a unified body. OPEC's power is
based upon its ability to retaliate against or to reward the conduct
of its consumers, both governments and private companies. 9 8 Re-
tinued drop in petroleum prices. OPEC Res. IV. 32, IV. 33, IV. 34 (1962). OPEC had
not tested its strength as an organization until this time, but resistance from the oil
companies to individual state action caused OPEC to try its power of collective ac-
tion against the companies. OPEC, however, did not act as an autonomous body,
calling instead for joint action among its Members. Id. By the Fifth Conference,
when a three-member committee was authorized by OPEC to continue negotiations
with the oil companies, sufficient progress had been made so that the measures
called for in Resolution IV.32 would not be necessary. OPEC Res. V.40 (1962).
Nonetheless, further resistance by the companies to "expensing royalties" caused
OPEC to call for a boycott on granting new oil rights until the companies acceded to
the new pricing system in all member states. OPEC Res. X.63 (1965), OPEC Res.
XI.72, Res. XI.73 (1965). The expensing royalty negotiations were carried out for the
most part by individual states; however, it seems that the success of these negotia-
tions was due to the potential power that collective bargaining could bring. It was
the first victory for OPEC, which discovered that the mere threat of retribution could
shatter the once immovable company resistance. See Vafai, Conflict Resolution in
the International Petroleum Industry, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 427, 434 (1971) [herein-
after cited as Vafai].
96. While the pricing negotiations of 1962-1965 were the first sign of OPEC's
strength, the negotiations leading to the Tehran Agreement in early 1971 marked
OPEC's emergence as a direct influence over the world petroleum market. Vafai, su-
pra note 95, at 428-29. See OPEC Res. XXI. 120 (1971); OPEC, RECORD AND REVIEW,
7-8 (1971) for details of the proposals and the agreement, as well as its companion
agreements negotiated later in 1971. OPEC presented general price guidelines
which formed the framework of the negotiations, appointed a three-member Ministe-
rial Committee-Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia-to negotiate on behalf of the Members
concerned, and threatened price legislation within the Member states if the
negotiating parties could not come to an agreement. Vafai supra note 95, at 429. The
Tehran Agreement was the product of careful planning by the Conference, which
formulated its strategy in December, 1970. The Conference was careful to recognize
the international legal principles of contracts, choosing the path of negotiations over
unilateral change. Devaux-Charbonnel, Les Accords de Teheran et de Tripoli, [1971]
ANNUAIRE FRAN(;AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 137 (Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique). The time for negotiations was ripe, however, for the worldwide energy
market had changed such that demand exceeded supply to a critical point. Consum-
ers, i.e., the companies, had little choice other than to agree to OPEC's demands.
Id. at 135.
97. Vafai, supra note 95, at 435.
98. Amuzegar, OPEC in the Context of the Global Power Equation, 4 DEN. J.
INT' L. & POL'Y 221, 227 (1974) [hereinafter cited as OPEC as a Global Power].
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taliatory measures include embargoes, regulation of operations,
controlling foreign investments of oil proceeds, discriminatory
price-fixing, and altering politico-military alliances. 99 Rewards, on
the other hand, include special concessions and cooperations in in-
vestments.' 00 These tactics have been utilized successfully in the
past, although they have greater power when used merely as a de-
terrence or an inducement. 1° 1 Of course, these weapons are effec-
tive only in a market situation in which demand exceeds supply,' 02
and only if the Members act as a unified body.10 3
Solidarity seems to be the main problem within OPEC. The
organization has been inconsistent in its support of individual
Members at various times, partly due to socio-political differ-
ences. 0 4 These differences have led to the formation of a coalition
within OPEC-the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OAPEC), which was responsible for the oil embargoes
of 1967 and 1973.105 OPEC has been careful in treating the
OAPEC problem, but has noted its detrimental effect on produc-
tion and on the interests of OPEC as a whole. 106
The limitations of OPEC as an organization can be illustrated
by three failures. First, OPEC has been unable to create an effec-
tive aid program for Third World states. 1 7 Second, OPEC has
been unable to draft a "Uniform Petroleum Code" or to establish
99. Id.
100. Id. at 228.
101. Id. An example of the use of embargo as a deterrent can be seen in both
the expensing royalty negotiations, see note 95 supra, and the Tehran Agreement ne-
gotiations, see note 96 supra.
102. See RUSTOW, supra note 5, at 106.
103. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 1, at 57.
104. COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 78. Some examples are the political align-
ments of Libya and Saudi Arabia, the border disputes between Iraq and Iran and be-
tween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and the geographical differences between the desert
states and the other members. Id.
105. Id. at 82-83. OAPEC called the boycotts because of the conflict between
Egypt and Israel. Egypt was a member of OAPEC at the time. During these embar-
goes, the non-Arab Members of OPEC continued to supply oil, but could not make
up the shortages resulting from the embargoes. Id.
106. See OPEC, RECORD AND REVIEW 4 (1973).
107. See Williams, The Aid Programs of OPEC Countries, 54 FOREIGN AFF.
308, 315-16 (1976). Although OPEC recognizes that higher oil prices have an even
greater detrimental effect on less-developed countries, any politically conscious at-
tempts to alleviate the burden of higher oil prices with increased aid have never
been fully implemented, such that OPEC members lag far behind the United States
in foreign aid. As a result, OPEC has not been able to achieve leadership of the
Third World states. Id.
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an inter-OPEC High Court "for the settlement of all disputes and
differences relating to petroleum matters."' 10 8 Finally, resolutions
passed by the Conference have been disregarded when not in
Member's interests. 10 9 These failures all seem to revolve around
the conflict between having a strong and independent OPEC as a
vanguard for the oil exporters and protecting the sovereignty of
each Member state. It seems the basis for OPEC's failures and
problems is that the Members will act according to their own inter-
ests and will not subordinate those interests to the interests of
OPEC as a whole unit.
OPEC's failures, nonetheless, seem to have been overshad-
owed by its success. This success has hinged upon the replacement
of coal by oil as the main fuel of the industrialized states. 110 Fur-
thermore, the location of Member states in economically and mili-
tarily strategic areas has discouraged criticism from the govern-
ments of the oil consumers."1
The only major external threat to OPEC's existence appears to
be either a large discovery of oil in a non-OPEC area, thus ending
OPEC domination of the market,"12 or a reduction in oil's impor-
tance in the world energy market."13 Internal threats of price-
cutting are unlikely so long as the control of a major portion of pro-
duction is concentrated in Member states whose income absorptive
capacity is relatively small, such as Saudi Arabia. 14 It seems
OPEC will exist so long as its economic benefits have a greater pri-
ority among the Members' individual interests over any divisive
feelings of state sovereignty.
108. See OPEC, Res. V.41 (1962). OPEC believed that it would be in the best
interests of the Members if their disparate laws concerning petroleum were unified,
and that a special international court be set up to mediate any disputes within
OPEC that would hinder productivity. It is difficult to say what happened to these
concepts, since there is no subsequent record of action on either. Most likely, they
were abandoned during discussions.
109. E.g., OPEC Res. XVII.94 (1969) asked Members not to grant new oil rights
to companies from highly industrialized states. Shortly thereafter, Qatar and Abu
Dhabi each granted oil rights to a Japanese company. See COMMUNITY, supra note 6,
at 80.
110. RUSTOW, supra note 5, at 118.
111. OPEC as Global Power, supra note 98, at 223-24.
112. Akins, The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here, 51 FOREIGN AFF. 462,
485 (1973).
113. Id.
114. Income absorptive capacity is the ability of a state to utilize income. The




OPEC was created as a challenge to the abuses of the interna-
tional petroleum industry, and it has proven to be an effective
force in the world's economy.11 5 Although its legal system was in-
tended to establish OPEC as a strong leader of oil exporting inter-
ests, the refusal to subordinate individual state interests to the in-
terests of OPEC as a whole has made OPEC merely a forum for its
Members' own self interests. The Members seem to be relying on
the continued importance of oil as a world energy source, 116 but
the current demand for petroleum may abate in the future. The
importance of having OPEC in the role of a strong, united, autono-
mous leader of the oil exporters seems to be inversely proportional
to the demand for oil. If its Members are to be protected from the
same type of competitive quarrels that brought about the need for
OPEC or from a strong reaction from the highly industrialized
states, OPEC will need to be strengthened as an organization.
OPEC will need to be restructured, removing the divisive ele-
ments of state sovereignty from the organization, before it can guar-
antee to its Members that it will protect their petroleum assets.
Laurence Stoehr
115. See, e.g., notes 95-96, supra.
116. WYANT, supra note 82, at 121.
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